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Summary 
This article focuses on the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which celebrated ten years of 
life last year. The article examines whether the UfM may evolve into an Energy Community in 
order to keep together its member states when developing projects in the energy sector, in which 
they don’t have the same interests. To what extent can the UfM become a driver for peace, 
stability and prosperity in the region of the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean? The article 
examines the multilateral and bilateral frameworks of cooperation in the Mediterranean basin. 
What is the institutional missing link that may unite these frameworks into a solid work platform? 
The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is a recent Egyptian initiative, developed outside the 
multilateral framework of the UfM. This initiative questions the relevance of the multilateral 
institutions and the bilateral relations developed between the Mediterranean coastal countries. 
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1. THE DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO ENERGY IN THE EAST 
MEDITERRANEAN 
Nowadays we are witnessing the increasing geo-economic significance of East Mediterranean, 
which constitutes a maritime energy competition crossroads. Large deposits of natural oil and 
gas are found at the bottom of the Levantine basin, which are estimated at 1.7 billion barrels of 
oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of gas. The marine area of South Crete and the Greek part of the 
Herodotus field have been considered of remarkable importance due to both their geological 
composition and the discovery of hydrocarbons.  
These developments have resulted into a further complication of the relations of the countries 
involved. 
Israel has historically been a net energy importer, but the recent findings of oil and gas reserves 
in its deep waters have led many experts to believe that it could turn into a net exporter, thanks 
                                                          
1 This article is the outcome of a research, which is co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social 
Fund - ESF) through the Operational Program «Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning 
2014-2020» in the context of the project MIS 5005494. This article is based on a collective research conducted by 
Anna Konstantinidou, Afroditi Semkou, Elias Andreadis and Elias Kolovos at the Faculty of Law of the Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki. 
2 This paper has been selected by the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (ΓΕΕΘΑ) and submitted to NATO’s 
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) within the framework of a call for papers issued by the said Organization 
relative to the Strategic Foresight Analysis Regional Perspectives Report on North Africa and the Sahel.  
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to the Tamar and Leviathan deepwater fields, located in the Mediterranean Sea west of Haifa3, 
and the shale and tight oil formations, which are able to produce huge quantities of oil, competing 
the USA and China reserves4. Those new developments have led to export deals with neighbor 
countries, such as Jordan and Egypt, changing Israel’s energy role and ensuring a promising 
future for the country5. Pursuant to Israel’s Energy Ministry plan, the coal will be replaced by 
natural gas by 2030.  
Egypt is the largest oil producer in Africa, outside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural gas producer on the continent, playing a vital role 
in international energy markets through its operation of the Suez Canal and the Suez-
Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline. Its natural gas reserves are enough to cover its own needs 
and export a big amount of them. The production and export system is governed by State owned 
companies, the Egyptian General Petroleum Cooperation and the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding 
Company6. The largest proportion of Egyptian gas production comes from the offshore fields of 
the Conic Field. Much of the gas production is exported to Libya, Syria, Israel and Jordan, as 
well as to third countries. Exports are conducted in a small percentage through pipelines (e.g. 
Arab Gas Pipeline), but also in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)7. Finally, after having 
concluded an Exclusive Economic Zone delimitation agreement with Cyprus, the Egyptian 
government has initiated negotiations with the Cypriot government in order to exploit the 
underwater hydrocarbon deposits located between their borders.  
At the beginning of the last decade Cyprus began to seriously think about its involvement in 
hydrocarbon research, following Egypt's above-mentioned efforts. The prospection initiated by 
Cyprus was made through concessions to international oil companies, of which Shell secured a 
42,000 sq km concession with a successful outcome. At the same time, seismic surveys carried 
out in the wider Marine Region of Cyprus gave important and positive evidence of the oil 
potential of the region south of the island. Major gas reserves were found in the Marine Region 
that lies off the coast of Israel (e.g. giant Tamar gas field, 90 km off Haifa). The above findings 
have given significant energy value to the marine region south of Cyprus. These discoveries 
have altered the country's energy and geopolitical profile. Cyprus has ratified the Convention on 
the New Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and signed an agreement on the delimitation of its 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Egypt in February 2003 and with Lebanon in January 
2007. 
The Greek energy sector is still largely dependent on fossil fuels, most of which are imported. 
Most of its energy requirements are covered by petroleum products alone. These petroleum 
products are not only used in the transport sector, but they are also converted in relevant amounts 
into electricity. In particular, the non-interconnected Greek islands obtain their electricity 
primarily from inefficient and expensive diesel generators. Natural gas, which also has to be 
imported at a significant cost, plays a growing role in meeting energy requirements. A national 
target of a 20% RES share in gross final energy consumption by 2020 has been set. Its main 
suppliers are Russia, from which it imports natural gas through pipelines that reach the country 
through other Balkan countries, as well as Algeria from which it imports liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), which in turn reaches the de-liquefaction station of Revythoussa. Finally, it also imports 
                                                          
3 U.S. Energy Information Agency, "Country Analysis Brief: Israel". 
4 David Caploe, "Israel May Hold the World's Third Largest Reserve of Shale Oil," Oil Price, 2011. 
5 Ken Silverstein, "Israel's Natural Gas Finds Win the World's Notice," Forbes, 2013. 
6 Independent Statistics and Analysis, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country analysis brief: Egypt, 2018. 
7 Georgios Chrysochou, The Energy Security Dimension of Southeastern Mediterranean Sea: Geopolitical Rivalries 
and Prospects for Greece and Cyprus, 2016. 
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natural gas through the Turkey-Greece interconnector pipeline, which operates since 2007, 
transporting Azeri gas through Turkey's territory to the Komotini terminal. The Trans-Adriatic 
Pipeline is crossing Northern Greece. Furthermore, many foreign business groups obtained 
concessions in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Western and Southern 
Greece. 
Turkey is a country that designated its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black Sea in 1986 and 
has since used its natural gas fields in the wider region to meet its domestic energy needs. The 
most important field of this area is the one located in the Marmara Sea. The British Petroleum, 
Shell and the Turkish company TRAO are responsible for the exploration and exploitation of 
these deposits8. Due to the inadequacy to fulfill its internal energy needs, Ankara imports 600 
bcf per year, primarily from Russia, using the Romania - Bulgaria - Turkey Pipeline and then 
through the Black Sea, using the Blue Stream pipeline. Turkey also imports 1 tcf of natural gas 
each year from the Azeri Shah Deniz deposit, which is located in the Caspian Sea and is 
connected to Turkey via the Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum pipeline. Finally, Ankara imports 49bcf of 
Iranian gas via the Iran - Turkey Pipeline. In Turkey there are also liquefaction facilities for 
natural gas, with a capacity of 175 bcf per year, imported from Algeria and Nigeria.  
The importance of Turkish energy corridor is growing day by day. The Greek-Turkish part of 
the Italy-Turkey-Greece Interconnector pipeline is completed in order to transfer gas from the 
Shah Deniz to the European market. Also, Turkey supports the proposals for the construction of 
the Trans - Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), together with the Trans - Adriatic Pipeline TAP 
and the South - East Europe Pipeline (SEEP), for the transportation of Azeri gas to the European 
market. The ultimate aim of this energy policy is to meet the domestic needs of Turkey's natural 
gas and to upgrade its role as the main gas transit country in the region9. 
However, Turkey’s negotiations with the EU are not advancing in a way to secure Turkish 
membership in a near future. In its report on EU enlargement policy published on 17 April 2018, 
the European Commission stated the following with regard to Turkey's accession to the EU: 
«Turkey has been significantly moving away from the European Union. Under the currently 
prevailing circumstances, no new chapters are considered for opening». 
Major Infrastructure Projects  
The creation of new infrastructure is the result of the discovery of new gas reserves in the region. 
EastMed 
The East Mediterranean Pipeline (East Med) is an ambitious project of 1,875 km, of which 1,385 
km is in deep water in the Mediterranean, with an annual capacity of approximately 14 dkm. It 
intends to transfer natural gas starting from 2025, from various sources of Eastern Mediterranean 
to the Italian and European gas networks. 
The original pipeline proposal came in 2003 from co-owners of IGI Poseidon, Italian-French 
Edison S.A. and DEPA S.A. It is an imprint of Greek diplomacy in the energy sector, for a 
unified link between the flows of the new major discoveries of the Israeli resources (mainly 
Leviathan), together with the Cypriot stocks. An interconnection of all these Levantine flows, 
                                                          
8 Georgios Chrysochou, id., op. cit.  
9 Miguel Eduardo Sánchez-Martín, Gonzalo Escribano Francés & Rafael de Arce Borda, Will Energy Save FDI 
Inflows to Turkey from the Cool Down of EU Accession Prospects? A Case Study of How Geo-political Alliances 
and Regional Networks Matter, 2015. 
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directed through Greek mainland, and the Poseidon submarine pipeline to the Ionian Sea, 
towards Italy / Europe.  
The East Med project bypasses Turkey. It was the catalyst for the strengthening of the relations 
between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, building on to the Israeli need to find a safe passage for the 
exportation of Leviathan's rich reserves.  
The Gas Forum 
The project for the establishment of a gas forum was first announced in October 2018 at the 
summit of Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus in Crete. On January 14, 2019 the Egyptian Petroleum 
Minister, Tarek el-Molla, hosted the Energy Ministers of Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, 
and the Palestinian Authority to discuss the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Forum (EMGF). This body, with headquarters in Cairo, will serve as the umbrella for 
cooperation and dialogue regarding the development of gas resources in the region. Turkey is 
the only country without oil and gas resources and one of the most important energy hubs in the 
world with several pipelines projects (SCP, TANAP and Turkish Stream) whose relevance could 
be mitigated by the aforementioned eastern Mediterranean consortium. As a result, after the 
discovery of Aphrodite fields in Cyprus, the option of a 2.200 km gas pipeline passing from 
Israel through Cyprus, Crete and Greece, bypassing Turkey is thought to be more suitable for 
the development of a Southern gas corridor, when compared to the sea pipeline of 500 km 
reaching Ceyhan, despite its higher cost.  
Turkey’s policy in Eastern Mediterranean is now to prevent any initiative, which will shrink its 
capacity to capitalize its geographical position as energy partner inside and outside the region. 
As a result, Turkey tries to gain time by blocking any solution for the development of new 
projects transporting the gas resources of Eastern Mediterranean to Europe bypassing the 
Turkish territory. 
The situation described requires viable solutions to the aforementioned issues. The establishment 
of European and international institutions along with the existing legislative instruments and 
regulatory frames should provide clear answers to the complexities which have arisen.  
Who can guarantee the transportation of natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe? 
What measures can secure the uninterrupted flow of gas to the European markets? How can 
investors be encouraged to build the necessary energy infrastructure? To what extent can this 
infrastructure be functional? Are gas transactions affected by the different legal requirements of 
the jurisdictions involved? How important is the notion of unbundling in developing the required 
infrastructure (i.e., the separation of marketing and supply activities)?  
The abovementioned Gas Forum is not being developed within the context of the UfM. Having 
in mind that Egypt is a co-founder of the UfM, isn’t it difficult to understand why Egypt did not 
chose to launch the Gas Forum within the UfM? Could the UfM provide the appropriate legal 
basis for the development of the Gas Forum? 
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2. UFM: THE MULTILATERAL PROJECT-ORIENTED FRAMEWORK 
In February 2007, in his campaign for presidential elections in France, Nicolas Sarkozy 
announced his vision for the Union of the Mediterranean10. In the beginning, the former French 
President intended to limit the membership to the coastal EU member states only. Germany 
opposed his plan, because it could not understand why all the other EU member states could not 
participate in an institution, when they would be requested to fund its activities. Finally, on 13-
14 March 2008, the European Council approved the establishment of the Union for the 
Mediterranean, as a follow-up to the Barcelona Process, where all EU member states would 
participate. 
The Founding Declaration, signed in Paris on 13 July 2008, provided for the establishment of a 
regional organization in Barcelona, marking the continuation of the Barcelona Process. All four 
pillars of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership were adopted as the Union's actions for the 
Mediterranean, while the Union itself would be "complementary" to bilateral relations held 
between the EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries. This meant that if the Union ever 
developed into a free trade area, a customs union or a common market, this would have to be 
decided not within the multilateral framework of the UfM, but within the context of the EU's 
bilateral relations with the non-EU Mediterranean countries. The UfM would be independent 
from the EU enlargement policy and funded by the Southern Dimension of the European 
Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI).  
In view of the above, one might question the added value of the establishment of the UfM. We 
would be unfair if we concluded that the establishment of the UfM did not make a clear progress 
since the Barcelona Process was launched. It is the only forum which keeps together around the 
same table all the governments of the region. The Mediterranean partnership has evolved into an 
international organization that clearly upgrades the level of political dialogue between the EU 
and the Mediterranean countries. In addition, the new organization is geared to implement 
specific projects of common interest for which a list of six priority areas was agreed:  
(1) Combating pollution in the Mediterranean Sea.  
(2) Developing infrastructure projects for maritime and road transport.  
(3) Undertaking civil protection actions to face natural disasters. 
(4) Developing energy projects focusing on renewable energy. 
(5) Developing Higher Education and Research activities. 
(6) Encouraging Mediterranean entrepreneurship. 
This was the original plan of President Sarkozy, who was inspired by the low policy project of 
Jean Monnet for the unification of Europe with the creation of the first European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The idea was correct, except that the ECSC was not only an actor as is the 
UfM today, but also a regulator. The UfM was not set up as a regulatory body but as a project-
oriented organization. The regulation of trade and other relations between the two categories of 
partners was not the Union’s business. To date, the UfM has created 54 projects worth a total of 
€ 5.6 billion in the blue economy, infrastructure, youth employment, gender equality, etc. Two 
projects constitute its highlights: the EuroMed University situated in Fès, Morocco, and the 
desalination plant built in Gaza. 
                                                          
10 Panagiotis Glavinis, «The futile Union for the Mediterranean, Ten years after the establishment of the 'Union for 
the Mediterranean'», 5th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "Poeessa" on AEGEAN: The Archipelago of 
Peace,p.9, 2018. 
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The Mediterranean region faces significant energy challenges today due to the increasing 
population with growing energy demands, the intensive industrialization and tourism growth that 
is also putting pressure on the energy resources, the average rise of temperature etc. Those 
challenges, if well addressed, can become business opportunities contributing to a sustainable 
energy transition. The region is rich in renewable energy sources, routing for low-carbon energy 
systems. There is also a potential to increase energy efficiency through the development of new 
technologies allowing energy saving and storage. Besides, developing gas and power 
transmission interconnections will lead to the progressive integration of energy markets in the 
region, representing an opportunity for countries to better face the challenge of energy security11. 
Within this context, the UfM coordinates the following policy dialogue platforms:  
 The UfM Regional Electricity Market Platform (UfM REM Platform),  
 The UfM Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Platform (UfM REEE Platform),  
 The UfM Gas Platform.  
These platforms are the only existing fora gathering all Euro-Mediterranean countries as well as 
key stakeholders, including financial institutions, regional organisations, industrial enterprises 
and energy experts. The UfM Energy Platforms hold an annual meeting devoted to the 
enhancement of synergies in the fields of renewable energies and energy efficiency, integration 
of electricity markets and gas in the Mediterranean region. Each platform develops its activities 
following specific Work Programmes including workshops, reports and studies, exchanging 
experiences and knowledge-sharing. 
More specifically, the UfM REM Platform aims at integrating progressively the energy systems 
and markets in the Mediterranean region and, in particular, at the enhancement of electricity 
exchanges and interconnections, in order to achieve a secure, affordable and sustainable 
electricity supply for the benefit of citizens and economies in the Euro-Mediterranean region.  
The UfM REEE Platform aims at promoting the progressive deployment of renewable energy 
and energy efficiency measures, in order to foster socio-economic development and sustainable 
energy transition.  
Finally, the objective of the UfM Gas Platform is to establish a regional structured dialogue 
allowing the progressive development of a Euro-Mediterranean gas market, promoting security, 
transparency and predictability of both demand and supply in a way to balance the interest of 
producing and consuming countries.  
Why none of these platforms was used for the development of the Gas Forum? 
3. THE BILATERAL FRAMEWORK 
When it comes to energy trade agreements the governance system is not single, but multi-
layered, which leads to less legal cohesiveness and as a result global energy insecurity12. One of 
the main weaknesses of the energy governance system is the absence of a single international 
institution focused on global energy supervision, as well as the lack of a single multilateral 
agreement overarching any other legal text relevant to energy in a comprehensive manner. On 
the contrary, there is a blend of cases of State-to-State cooperation when it comes to global 
                                                          
11 https://ufmsecretariat.org/ufm-energy-platforms/ 
12 Rafael Leal-Arcas, Costantino Grasso, Juan Alemany Rios, Multirateral, Regional and Bilateral Trade Governance, 
RELP, 2015,p. 62. 
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energy economy. EU for example13 is cooperating with energy-rich countries through bilateral 
trade agreements14. 
EU is 54% energy dependent on the outside world for two main reasons15. First the exponential 
growth of oil consumption16, and second the secular decline in Europe’s ability to mine coal at 
competitive prices17. To achieve the reduction of its energy supply vulnerability, the EU should 
manage not to rely on imported energy and to improve not only its energy efficiency mechanisms 
but also its renewable energy production system18. Furthermore, when it comes to energy that is 
imported, the sources have to be diversified in order to remain independent. Last but not least, 
the EU should invest in the enhancement of the integration, flexibility and liberalization of its 
energy market so as the inter-State energy trade and transportation is achieved at a reasonable 
price.  
Since the aforementioned targets are not met, the EU is entering into Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with third countries. The latter provide the general framework 
for the development of bilateral economic relations and the legal basis for the delivery of 
development assistance to their contracting parties, in order to actually achieve those 
agreements’ objectives. These agreements, however, do not alter tariffs in the trade relations of 
the contracting parties. A third series of more sophisticated commercial agreements in relation 
to PCAs are the so-called Deep and Comprehensive Agreements (DCA), which now replace 
PCAs when they expire. These agreements provide for the progressive reduction and elimination 
of tariffs in bilateral trade relations. The DCAs also aim to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA). 
In fact, the DCAs are mixed agreements, which in addition to a FTA extend the parties' 
cooperation to sectors other than trade, such as in the fields of economy, security, rule of law, 
human rights, energy, environment etc. Basically, however, a DCA is a FTA, which may evolve 
into a more integrated form of trade cooperation within a Customs Union. In the Customs Union, 
the Parties eliminate tariffs in their trade of goods and, moreover, adopt a common external tariff 
in relation to third country exporters wishing to import their products into a Customs Union. 
STATE TYPE OF 
AGREEME
NT 
PROVISIONS ON 
ENERGY 
PROVISIONS ON 
LAWS’ 
APPROXIMATION 
 EGYPT Association 
Agreement  
 Article 53 Energy 
The priority areas of co-operation 
shall be:  
• the promotion of renewable 
energies; 
Article 48 
Approximation of 
laws 
 The Parties shall use 
their best endeavors to 
approximate their 
                                                          
13 Svein S. Andersen, Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, «Energy Union Europe’s New Liberal Mercantilism?», 
International Political Economy Series, 2017. 
14 Rafael Leal-Arcas, A. Filis, “The fragmented governance of the global energy economy: a legal institutional 
analysis“, The Journall of World Energy Law & Business, Vol.6, Issue 4,2013 p.1-58. 
15 M. Rostowska, “Energising TTIP: A Step towards Better EU Energy Security “PISM Bulletin, No 57(652), 2014, 
p.1. 
16 James Frederic Dewhurst, John O. Coppock, Europe’s needs and resources, V1, Trends and Prospects in Eighteen 
Countries, p. 562, 2013. 
17  Radulescu Irina Gabriela, Renewable Energy Strategies: Where European Union Headed?, Annals of the 
„Constantin Brâncuşi” University of Târgu Jiu, Economy Series, - Information society and sustainable development 
, Special Issue/2015. 
18 Bram Delvaux, Alice Guimaraes-Purokoski “Vertical Divisions of Competences between the European Community 
and its Member States in the Energy Field- Some remarks on the Evolution of Community Energy Law and 
Policy,2008. 
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• the promotion of energy-saving 
and energy efficiency;  
• applied research into data bank 
networks in the economic and 
social sectors, linking Community 
and Egyptian operators in 
particular;  
• Support for the modernization and 
development of energy networks 
and for their linking to European 
Community networks. 
respective laws in 
order to facilitate the 
implementation of this 
Agreement 
ALGERIA  Association 
Agreement  
Article 61 Energy  
The aims of the cooperation in the 
energy and the mining shall be: 
a) Institutional, legislative and 
regulatory upgrading to ensure that 
activities are regulated and 
investment promoted. 
b) Technical and technological 
upgrading to prepare energy and 
mining companies for the 
requirements of the market 
economy competition 
c) The development of partnerships 
between European and Algerian 
companies in the activities of 
exploration, production, processing, 
distribution and services in the 
energy and mining sector. 
 
The priority areas of cooperation in 
this respect shall be: 
- Adaption of the institutional, 
legislative and regulatory 
framework of activities in the 
energy and mining sectors to 
market economy rules by means of 
technical, administrative and 
regulatory assistance 
 - Support for efforts to restructure 
public enterprises in the energy and 
mining sector 
- building partnership in the areas of 
- oil and gas exploration, production 
and processing 
- electricity production  
- distribution of petroleum products 
- production of equipment and 
services used in the production of 
energy products  
Article 56 
Approximation of 
laws 
Cooperation shall be 
aimed to helping 
Algeria to bring it 
legislation closer to 
that of the Community 
in the areas covered by 
the agreement. 
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- developing and transforming the 
potential of mining 
- development of oil, gas and 
electricity distribution, 
- support for the modernization and 
development of energy networks 
and for they linking to European 
Community networks 
- the setting up of databases on the 
mining and energy sectors 
- the support and promotion of 
private investment in energy and 
mining activities 
- the environment, the development 
of renewable energies and energy 
efficiency 
- the promotion of technology 
transfers in the energy and mining 
sector  
JORDAN  Association 
Agreement  
Article 74 Energy 
The priority areas of cooperation 
will be: 
 -the promotion of renewable 
energies and indigenous energy 
sources 
- the promotion of energy-saving 
and energy efficiency 
- Applied research into databank 
networks in the economic and 
social sectors, linking Community 
and Jordanian 
-support for the modernization and 
development of energy networks 
and for their link-up to Community 
Cooperation will also focus on 
facilitating transit of gas, oil and 
electricity. 
Article 69 
Approximation of 
laws 
The Parties shall use 
their best endeavors to 
approximate their 
respective laws in 
order to facilitate the 
implementation of this 
Agreement 
ISRAEL  Association 
Agreement 
Article 51 Energy 
1. The Parties consider that global 
warming and the depletion of fossil 
fuel sources are a serious threat to 
mankind. The Parties shall therefore 
cooperate with a view to developing 
sources of renewable energy, to 
ensure the use of fuels with the 
purpose of limiting pollution of the 
environment and promoting energy 
conservation. 
2. The Parties shall endeavor to 
encourage operations designed to 
Article 55 
Approximation of 
laws 
The Parties shall use 
their best endeavors to 
approximate their 
respective laws in 
order to facilitate the 
implementation of this 
Agreement. 
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favor regional cooperation on 
matters such as transit of gas, oil 
and electricity. 
 
LEBANON  Association 
Agreement 
(signed on 
2002, entered 
into force 
2006)  
Article 54 Energy 
Cooperation shall focus: 
 a) Promotion of renewable energy 
 b) Promotion of energy saving and 
energy efficiency 
c) applied research relating to 
networks of databases linking the 
two parties ‘ economic and social 
operators 
d) Supporting modernization and 
development of energy networks 
and the interconnection of such 
networks with Community 
networks. 
 
Article 49 
Approximation of 
Legislation  
 The Parties shall use 
their best endeavors to 
approximate their 
respective laws in 
order to facilitate the 
implementation of this 
Agreement. 
PALESTIN
E 
Interim 
Association  
Agreement 
Article 48 Energy 
The objective of cooperation on 
energy will be to help the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip acquire the 
technologies and infrastructures 
essential to its development, 
particularly with a view to 
facilitating links between its 
economy and that of the 
Community. 
The priority areas of cooperation 
will be: — the promotion of 
renewable energies, — the 
promotion of energy-saving and 
energy efficiency,  
— support to operations designed to 
facilitate the transit of gas, oil and 
electricity, and applied research into 
data bank networks in the economic 
and social sectors linking 
Community^ and Palestinian 
operators in particular, and 
— support for the modernization 
and development of energy 
networks and for their link up to 
European Community networks. 
Article 41 
Approximation of 
laws 
The objective of 
cooperation will be to 
approximate 
Palestinian Council 
legislation to that of 
the Community, in the 
areas covered by the 
Agreement. 
TUNISIA  Association Agreement (1998) (No data are available on the text of the 
agreement) 
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European Union and Morocco are in negotiations to conclude a Deep 
Comprehensive Free trade Agreement. The DCFTA will build on the existing 
Association Agreement 
MΟROCC
O 
Association Agreement (2000) (No data are available on the text of the 
agreement) 
 
European Union and Morocco are in negotiations to conclude a Deep 
Comprehensive Free trade Agreement. The DCFTA will build on the existing 
Association Agreement 
TURKEY  Customs Union 
 There are no special settings for the energy 
SYRIA  Co – Operation Agreement  
 There are no special settings for the energy 
MAURITAN
IA 
On 21 September 2018 Mauritania signed the Economic Partnership 
Agreement between West Africa and EU 
 There are no special settings for the energy 
 
The bilateral framework of the aforementioned agreements is inefficient to promote the effective 
approximation of laws, which will enable the creation and operation of common projects in the 
energy sector. This is why, in another geographic area, the EU established a specialized agency 
to this effect. 
4. THE ENERGY COMMUNITY  
Through the so-called «Athens Process», the EU promoted the creation of a European 
organization for the integration of the regional energy markets between the European countries 
and the third countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus neighboring the EU19. It is Energy 
Community, an international organization based in Vienna, established under an international 
treaty signed in Athens in October 2005, which came into force in 2006. The Energy Community 
should inspire the UfM and make a positive contribution to its orientation20 in a way that the 
UfM won’t just accomplish a project, but it will also regulate a sector of high importance for 
both the Mediterranean coasts. The key role of the Energy Community is the approximation of 
laws of its member states in a specific sector, which will enable the markets inside and outside 
the EU to operate in an integrated form. If enabled with regulatory competences, the UfM could 
indeed become the appropriate framework for the development of major energy infrastructure 
projects in the region.  
The question still remains to what extent is the Energy Community the missing link of the UfM 
in order for this institution to keep together its member states when developing ambitious 
projects in the energy sector, in which not all of them have the same interests.  
5. FINAL REMARKS 
Having examined both the bilateral and the multilateral framework under which the effort for 
the integration of the wider Mediterranean energy policy is carried out, it is now time to produce 
some observations, suggestions and conclusions regarding the furthering of the cooperation 
                                                          
19 https://www.energy-community.org/ 
20 Simone Tholens, An EU–South Mediterranean Energy Community: The Right Policy for the Right Region?, The 
International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs, 2014. 
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between the states so as to achieve the aforementioned goal, but also and most importantly the 
integration of non EU markets into the common EU energy market.  
But why is it that the initiatives have only produced so limited results? Why is it that there are 
two multilateral work platforms for the same –admittedly small– geographical area? Why do we 
begin to notice signs of further fragmentation? What is the missing link that will unite the 
bilateral and the multilateral framework into a solid work platform? Should it be a new initiative 
or the further strengthening and expansion of the existing one? 
To begin with, it is important to note that although the bilateral framework has indeed produced 
some results for the EU in terms of the integration –or better unitization– of non-EU neighboring 
energy markets, it is clear that it has only produced acceptable results when the utter aim of the 
counterpart was to eventually join the EU as a member State. Otherwise the PCAs have proven 
fragile, easy to manipulate if pressure is applied by external powers and prone to breaking down, 
with the most prominent case being the one of Ukraine. It is therefore imperative that the 
multilateral framework of the UfM be enhanced in order to produce efficient and systematic 
results towards this end. Thus, what is the missing link between transforming the wider 
Mediterranean area into a common energy market and attaching it to the EU? Is it the Union for 
the Mediterranean or a Mediterranean Energy Community?  
From our point of view, the missing link in the Mediterranean institutional framework is 
definitely an Energy Community, being both a regional and a sectoral institution, bearing 
regulatory powers, in contrast to the UfM which is only a regional project-oriented institution 
with virtually no regulatory powers. Thus, all efforts should be focused on further strengthening 
and broadening the regulatory authorities of the UfM, building on the model of the Energy 
Community, should we want to achieve a common “Mediterranean market”, including a gas 
market. 
In any case, it would be a serious omission not to point out the various peculiarities of the 
Mediterranean and especially the East Mediterranean region, an area where not one but two 
regional superpowers exist, none of which is a member state in the EU. These two regional 
superpowers –Turkey and Israel– have fundamentally conflicting interests, which further 
impediment the dialogue and process of integration.  
On the one hand, Turkey is a full NATO member state and still in accession talks with the EU. 
Turkey bears an observer status in the Energy Community and is a full member of the Union for 
the Mediterranean.  
On the other hand, Israel is only a NATO partner, not in EU accession talks21, not an Energy 
Community member, but a member in the Union for the Mediterranean.  
Turkey has established its place in the East Mediterranean as a major energy transit country, 
whereas Israel is trying to become more involved in the energy market, especially lately with the 
discovery of at least one major gas field in the Levantine basin and with the announcement of 
the ambitious EastMed pipeline, a project included by the EU in its third Projects of Common 
Interest list, since it will develop as a joint project with Greece and Cyprus. This is a very risky 
project since the pipeline will have to be constructed in very deep waters –deepest than any other 
offshore pipeline in the world–, which skyrockets the costs, but also the security of the 
construction and as a consequence it is currently being promoted only by the three interested 
                                                          
21 Although very recently and for the first time since their initiation, the EU Parliament has called for a halt to the EU 
– Turkey accession talks. 
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states, with minimal interest from investors. What remains to be seen is how far the states will 
go in terms of incentives in order to see the project realized, what incentives they are prepared 
to grant to the potential investors and how deep into their pockets will they reach for the 
materialization of the endeavor. The sole purpose of this project starting from Israel continuing 
to Cyprus and then Greece, with the purpose to connect in the main Greek gas network and 
further into the EU, is to virtually bypass Turkey. The project would be definitely more viable 
and safe if it was connected in the already existing Turkish network in Ceyhan.  
Lastly, we can find a common pattern between these two countries when it comes to long 
unresolved issues such as the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus and the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank, which if solved would significantly change the entire picture of the 
Mediterranean as a whole, but most importantly would facilitate the integration of the wider 
Mediterranean energy market. 
To that end, we can only underline the fact that the recent gas discoveries in the Levantine basin, 
especially in Cyprus and Israel, have caused negative reactions by Turkey, with regular seismic 
surveys being conducted in the area in order for Turkey to assert its power and secure its interests.  
On the other hand, the EastMed pipeline project, has given the chance to traditional and historic 
power in the area, Egypt, to undertake an initiative in order to exploit its own natural resources 
in an efficient manner, but also to reassert its influence in the Middle East. The newly announced 
EastMed Gas Forum is the manifestation of the aforementioned effort, but also of the coalition 
between Egypt and Israel in order to bypass Turkey for the supply of energy to the EU.  
In addition, it is clear that the UfM is not the forum of choice for Egypt, even though Egypt was 
the first co-presiding member with France since Algeria, another major gas producing and 
exporting EU partner, is already far ahead in terms of its cooperation with the EU.  
Therefore, the traditional Arab competition in the area still exists, also including the religious 
component since Turkey, although not an Arab State, is the only Muslim country in accession 
talks with the EU.  
The EastMed Gas Forum will lead to a further fragmentation in the wider Mediterranean area, 
producing an even smaller region, the East Mediterranean, where two regional superpowers are 
in direct conflict of interest. 
It is clear that the energy situation in the Mediterranean is a complex one, both in terms of 
geopolitics but also actual interests. The way forward is definitely tricky, however if proper steps 
are taken in order to ensure a coordinated dialogue, processes and proper regulatory framework, 
within the already existing but strengthened platform of the UfM equipped with Energy 
Community’s competences, the results will be less theoretical and more practical.  
However in order to reach the goal of a common Mediterranean energy market, one will 
necessarily need to align the interests of the two aforementioned regional superpowers, firstly 
by solving long standing issues, secondly by not excluding or bypassing from any matters 
pertaining to the work platform and lastly by encouraging their active participation in an 
enhanced UfM. 
